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Chapter I 
The Institutional Setting: Is There a Regulatory Deficit in the 
European Community? 
1. Harmonisation as a Vehicle for Community Intervention 
One of the most striking features of regulatory techniques ,used in federal 
States is their diversity. "Traditional" legislation is only one of them: grants-in-
aid or other incentives can be used by federal government, to convince Member 
States to follow its guidelines, and specialised agencies be set up to channel 
their action. 
Thirty-five years after the coming into force of the Treaties of Rome, such 
flexible opportunities remain far more limited in the European Community 
setting. Harmonisation -- or, in the language of the EC Treaty, "the 
approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States" (Article 100) -- has remained the primary form of 
action. The Community adopts a legislative act, which is subsequently 
transposed by the Member States into their own legal order, and applied by their 
own administration. The EC has occasionally provided guidelines for 
implementation by the Member States requiring them for example, to collect 
specific data or to mutually inform each other of decisions adopted in a given 
field. Yet, if one overlooks those important powers enjoyed by the Commission 
in competition or anti-dumping policies, the Community has never significantly 
departed from its traditional mode of decentralised administration. 
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Why did the framers of the Community treaties choose to limit the 
Community to interventions of a legislative type? There is no clear cut answer 
to such a broad question: the legislative history of the EEC Treaty is not yet 
accessible to study, and it is far from certain that the issue was addressed at the 
time the Treaty was negotiated. This notwithstanding, several factors can be 
tentatively combined to explain this situation. All relate to the same basic 
reality: the Community has been endowed with limited powers. 
This is true as regards legislative competences. Even prior to the 
Maastricht Treaty, there was no doubt that the Community, just as any 
international organisation, enjoyed only those powers conferred on it, by the 
treaties. By formally establishing that 
"[T]he Community shall act within the limits of the powers 
conferred upon it by this Treaty", 
Article 3B of the Treaty on European Union only raised to the level of formal 
treaty commitments that which was widely held to be a general principle of 
Community constitutional law, known as the principle of attributed powers 
("competences d'attribution"). Even those generic provisions, such as Articles 
100 or 235 are - in principle at least - limited in scope. 
This element clearly impinged upon internal market policy. Article 100, 
for instance, suggests that the Community is supposed to act only if, and to the 
extent that, national regulatory policies have an adverse effect on the 
establishment of a unified market. It was therefore proper to limit its 
intervention to a mere harmonization of national provisions, rather than 
endowing it with more substantial means of action. The emphasis on 
harmonisation of national provisions can thus be seen as an institutional 
reflection of the peripheral importance of social regulation in the Community 
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context. Indeed, Community lawyers tend to insist that the use by the 
Community of its competences should be such that it will not completely pre-
empt Member States's competence in the area of social regulation1. Hence, inter 
alia, the strong insistence on the resort to directives, which must be transposed 
by national authorities into their legal orders, and which thus leave them, in 
theory at least, a certain leeway as to the methods by which their objectives are 
to be achieved2• 
Harmonisation must also be seen in relation to the role of Member States 
in the Community system. As is known, the Community .is a far less 
autonomous body than any federal government. Member States still largely 
control the legislative process; they are responsible for the implementation of 
most Community acts. The delegation to an autonomous body of important 
administrative powers, was likely to be resented as being too intrusive as it 
would alter the delicate balance of power between the Community and its 
Member States. Concerns of this nature undoubtedly played a role in the 
definition of the duties that were assigned and of the means that were granted 
to the Community. Suffice it to state that an enormous growth in its activities 
notwithstanding, and despite the frequent complaints one hears about the "ever-
increasing Brussels bureaucracy", the Community Administration, with a staff 
of some 10 000 officials is still, in numbers at least, no more than the 
administration of a medium-size European city. The approximation of national 
laws had the great advantage of enabling the Community to intervene in a 
1 See for instance the debate in Fallon and Maniet (1990) regarding product safety. 
2 Article 189 of the EEC Treaty. Member States sensitivity on this issue was confinned by the 
adjunction to the Single Act of a declaration inviting the Commission to make use of directives in 
its proposals pursuant to Article lOOA whenever harmonisation involves the amendment of legislative 
provisions in more than one Member State. 
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number of areas, without at the same time depriving the Member States of any 
possibility to act. 
Likewise, the Community has limited financial resources and the major 
part of these are devoted to a voracious agricultural policy, leaving only limited 
room for manoeuvre in other areas. It seems clear in any event that the principle 
of attributed powers makes it impossible for the Community to use its spending 
power beyond its sphere of legislative competence (Lenaerts, 1990, 223r All 
this makes it difficult for the Community to systematically employ the "carrot-
and-stick" approach which is familiar to most federal governments. 
2. Harmonisation and its Shortcomings 
Most reviews of Community policies are essentially lengthy catalogues of 
legislative provisions. However, a problem-oriented approach reveals a number 
of flaws, the origin of which can be traced to the particular profile of 
Community acts of intervention. 
The difficulties which surround the harmonisation process are well-known. 
Decision making is slow and cumbersome because of the ever-growing 
complexity of the subjects covered and of the necessity of consensus. The 
adjustment to technical progress is difficult (Dashwood, 1983). Moreover, 
harmonisation is carried through with recourse to an instrument - the directive -
which must be transposed by Member States into their domestic legal orders. 
3 See for instance the common position adopted in October 1991 by the Council of Ministers as 
regards the proposed directive on general product safety, or Directive 83/189 establishing a system 
of murual information on technical regulations adopted at national level (OJ L 109/8 of 26 March 
1983). 
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This often results in huge bottlenecks at the implementation level; it may also 
explain the attention given by Community bodies to formal compliance, namely 
the adoption by national legislatures of the measures prescribed by the 
directives, rather than to the substantive observance of their provisions. Although 
the Commission has repeatedly stated its intention to go beyond transposition 
and to systematically monitor administrative application, it is not apparent 
whether it is well equipped to so do. Lastly, this two tier legislative process 
means that the Community is deprived of any direct power over those firms and 
other private actors who are the true addressees of social regulation, since it 
does not have the power to attach direct sanctions to the violation of Community 
norms and thus to enforce them. 
All these elements clearly curtail the overall efficiency of the 
Community's regulatory action. Another problem is the lack of flexibility 
inherent to such a system. As indicated above, the harmonisation process was 
primarily dominated by market integration concerns with a corollary emphasis 
on uniformity. This tendency was further aggravated by the fact that the 
Community, being generally deprived of an administrative power of its own, has 
often found it necessary to make recourse to very detailed directives in order to 
ensure their uniform application. It is not altogether clear whether such a process 
might adequately cope with the variety of situations existing within the 
Community. True, it has been shown that even in its current stage of 
development, Community law possesses a wide range of techniques that provide 
an important measure of flexibility (Ehlermann, 1984). Yet, for a variety of 
reasons, not all difficulties can be anticipated nor accommodated in a complex 
and fairly inflexible legislative phase (Scharpf, 1988). Very often one might only 
then properly assess and weigh up the various interests involved during the 
process of the application of a norm to a concrete situation. The regulation of 
t 
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pharmaceutical products offers an example of just such a situation: although 
national rules pursue similar objectives, their application differs widely from 
country to country because of existing divergences between medical and 
regulatory cultures (Kaufer, 1989). 
Naturally, where one does not wish to place market integration in 
jeopardy, this plea for flexibility should not be seen as an open invitation to 
grant further discretionary powers to the Member States. But this issue must 
eventually be addressed: otherwise there is a real risk that Community regulation 
will aggravate an already serious implementation problem, it being insufficiently 
sensitive to the variety of situations with which national regulators have to deal. 
Modern constitutional theories have stressed the changing functions of the 
second branch of government (administration) both in the welfare state and the 
\ 
regulatory state. Administration does not merely comprise the execution of 
, legislation: the more comprehensive executive tasks become, the more 
sophisticated administrative techniques are needed. As we shall se.e below 
(Chapter II), in the whole area of risk control and management, administrators 
are often entrusted with policy-making functions. Hence the efforts of the 
Community to write detailed directives which include provisions on the "quality" 
of regulatory bodies (independence, expertise, staffing). But in several areas, the 
Community's lack of administrative competences is a serious obstacle to 
' achieving Community objectives. 
Put together these elements are responsible for what one might term the 
Community's "regulatory deficit": the Community is present in an evergrowing 
number of areas, b~f institutional constraints, its action is at times 
sub-optimal. 
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3. The Single Market Programme: New Openings and New 
Problems 
To a large extent, the internal market has acted as a catalyst upon the 
above-mentioned problems. On the one hand, the programme was largely 
conceived as a legislative exercise: the White Paper~ released by the 
Commission in 1985, listed around 300 measures to be adopted by the 
Community by the end of 1992. As most of these acts were adopted in the form 
of a directive, it was to be foreseen that this would give rise to problems at the 
implementation level. The problem came to the fore right on cue in 1988, when 
the Commission realised that only a handful of directives had been duly 
implemented by all Member States. 
At the same time, awareness of regulatory problems had clearly grown in 
ommunity circles in the few years prior to the launching of the internal market 
rogramme. Several features of the new approach suggested by the Commission 
aimed to provide a remedy to the shortcomings of the earlier approach. The 
h . l "d the-): t 1 . . f . . emp as1s m upon e mu ua recogmhon o national regulations and standards 
and that laid on the delegation o~ ·)quasi-legislative powers to private 
standardisation bodies, were conceivecHI's alternatives to a cumbersome rule-
--=-~~ 
making process. As a result, the White Paper suggested restricting harmonisation 
to the laying down of basic health and safety requirements (Commission, 198'5,' 
18). It was also expected that this new approach would increase the range of 
choices available to consumers, thereby creating proper competition among 
national rules. The assumption was that this process will facilitate technical and 
regulatory adjustment and eventually lead to convergence around one or a few 
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basic models. Thus, ex-ante harmonisation would be, in part at least, replaced 
by a market-driven process, resulting ultimately in spontaneous adaptation 
(Prosi, 1990). 
Yet, in spite of its many advantages, mutual recognition cannot be seen 
as a panacea. It cannot be suitably adapted to all types of product, nor can it 
deal with all regulatory problems (Siebert, 1990, Majone, 1991). It puts legal 
certainty at risk, as distinct national regulations must coexist. National 
administrations sometimes find it difficult to identify what their legal obligations 
are4• Moreover, mutual recognition of national rules is not always sufficient: 
divergences in national administrative practices at the level of licensing or of 
certification, may hamper free movement. In fact, more than being regarded as 
a regulatory technique, mutual recognition may be seen as an integration 
instrument which creates pressures in favour of the removal of trade barriers. 
Thus, how exactly regulatory intervention is to be conducted at Community 
level largely remains an open question. 
4. The Lessons of Maastricht 
This is not the place to engage in a detailed assessment of the Treaty on 
European Union. Yet it is worth pointing out that - irrespective of what its 
ultimate fate will be - the Treaty contains two important political signals, which 
have been further developed in the ensuing ratification debates. Both are of 
direct relevance to our concern. 
4 In response to this kind of concern, the Commission has started to publish communications 
setting out the legal situation in various sectors of the economy. 
---
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i. The Member States are not prepared to accept an unlimited 
expansion of Community competences. 
A number of elements indicate their reluctance in this respect. Aft~r 
lengthy debates, ~hey have ~dopted the three pillar structure suggested by the 
Luxembourg Presidency, which can only be read as a refusal to "communitarize" 
fo;eign policy and immigration matters. Even in the Community sphere, the new 
competences established by the Maastricht Treaty in fields such as education, 
culture, public health or consumer protection are replete with reservations: the 
Community can encourage cooperation among the Member States, support and 
supplement their action, but harmonisation of the law of the Member States is 
often excluded. Thus, the impression is that the main object of many new 
provisions is not so much to legitimize Community' intervention in a number 
of fields in which it was already present, but somehow to make sure that it 
would not go beyond certain limits. Naturally, this impression is only 
strengthened by the inclusion of the much vaunted subsidiarity principle in the 
Treaty. Even if there are reasons to doubt that Article 3B as it currently stands 
could be readily used by the Court of Justice, it is clear that it entails a powerful 
message, one directed at Community institutions: Member States will oppose 
any move that appears to threaten the current balance of power. 
ii. The Commission has been weakened. 
The Commission clearly won "the battle of the Single Act". Many of its 
proposals were adopted by the intergovernmental conference. The endorsement 
of the internal market programme enabled it to dominate the Community's 
agenda for much longer than had its predecessors. Thanks to the development 
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of majority voting and the establishment of the cooperation procedure, it played 
a central role in relationships between the Council and the Parliament. 
In contrast, it reaped a meager harvest in Maastricht. Not only were most 
of its proposals (generalisation of majority voting, new hierarchy of norms, 
implementation powers) postponed or rejected, but its institutional status was 
weakened. One cornerstone of its power, the right of initiative, has been watered 
down in monetary policy where it only enjoys the right, sometimes shared with 
the European Central Bank, to put forward "recommendations" which are not 
protected by the unanimity rule (previously contained in Article 149). It is also 
bound to play a lesser role in the new co-decision procedure. Furthermore, some 
declarations attached to the Treaty (declarations on transparency and access to 
information, on the cost-benefits evaluation of Commission proposals) suggest 
that its legitimacy has been questioned -- a fact which is amply confirmed by 
the harsh statements on the "appointed bureaucracy" heard in the ratification 
debates underway in several Member States. 
5. The Post-1992 Challenge 
The above elements indicate that the Community will be facing a 
awkward challenge in the years to come. 
On the one hand, there are reasons to suggest that the harmonisation of 
laws, as it has so far been employed, is not sufficient to establish and regulate 
"an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured" (New Art. 7B), and that other types of 
Community intervention should be envisaged. On the other hand, the outcome 
of the intergovernmental conferences has provided ample evidence that national 
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governments were not prepared to accept a substantial alteration of the balance 
of power between the Member States and the Community. 
One is therefore forced to walk a tight rope. True, implementation 
problems have now gained the status of a political problem, as shown by the ad 
hoc declaration appended to the Maastricht Treaty, which leaves room to hope 
that the Member States might be convinced that some changes are needed in 
order to achieve the objective they endorsed in 1985. Yet, as things stand, it 
seems unlikely that they will accept any major initiative which questions their 
implementation powers. All proposed solutions to the regulatory deficit should 
therefore give due consideration to this basic political reality. 
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Chapter II 
From Internal Market Policy to Risk Regulation 
Prompted by its Internal Market programme, the Community has already 
moved beyond its traditional legislative policies. Its recent activities are by no 
means restricted to the establishment of a legislative framework ensuring the 
free movement of goods and the availability of services throughout the 
Community. Instead, as Member States regulation has been found to be 
restrictive of trade in the Community, it has either fallen or has required 
standardisation. Thus the Community has been forced to develop measures 
which either standardize or substitute national provisions. Recent policy 
programmes have thus become more comprehensive and legislative techniques 
have changed profoundly. In the first section we addressed the institutional 
framework of these changes and the challenges they pose. In this part of the 
paper we are first going to supplement these deliberations by approaching the 
regulatory tasks the Community faces from another angle. The complementary 
starting point is sought in the "object" of the Community's activities. The so-
called risk problem, namely the growing concern for protection against safety 
and environmental hazards needs to be, and is in fact, taken into account in the 
policies and the legislative framework which aim at the completion of the 
Internal Market. By focusing on this background, additional aspects of the 
Community's tasks can be more clearly identified and the problems and 
prospects for further improving the EC's regulatory performance better 
elaborated. 
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1. The Impact of the Risk Problem 
"Risks" are an unavoidable side effect of societal activities and modern 
techniques of production. Risks are deliberately taken because of expected 
benefits. Deliberate risk taking presupposes both an interest in such benefits and 
a capacity to detect risks and to control them to a degree that seems socially 
acceptable. The gathering of information on risks, the establishment of bodies 
responsible for risk assessment, the entrusting of officials with the task of taking 
action in emergency cases form the core elements of modern safety legislation 
throughout industrialised societies. But the impact of the risk problem reaches 
further. The need to assess and control safety and environmental risks has not 
only generated specialised legislative reactions but is today influencing policy-
making on a much broader scale. 
1.1. Legislation or Policy? 
/~~ 
A telling indicator for the~omnipresence of safety and environmenta:.J 
concerns is the recent appearance of the Community's Communication on 
industrial policy [COM (90) 556] together with the Green Paper on European 
· standardisation. Both documents strongly underline that the taking into account 
of safety and environmental concerns and the promotion of stringent standards 
should not be seen as a threat to the independence of the economy, but rather 
as a means whereby its long term competitiveness might be furthered. Similar 
deliberations play an important role in other related fields such as certification 
policies and measures aiming at voluntary commitments of enterprises, such as 
the draft regulation on ecological auditing [COM (91) 459]. This is not to 
suggest that the growing awareness of the risk problem in so many policy 
initiatives renders specific safety legislation and risk management activities 
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superfluous. It would, however, be both unfeasible and unproductive to attempt 
to provide for risk regulation within the general framework of the establishment 
of the Single Market. Risk only arises as a result of economic process. It would 
not be possible to pre-judge exactly which risks will arise and to pre-determine_ 
standards and mechanisms to deal with them. To attempt do so is in fact to put 
the brakes on the economic process. Thus re-active and free standing regulatory 
policies are required. Logic, however, demands that these structures do not upset 
the primary purposes of the Community, the completion of the internal market 
and the formulation of industrial policy. Risk regulation must enhance and not 
stifle economic progress. 
1.2. General Features of Product Regulation and Safety Legislation 
Product safety legislation initially focused upon particular dangerous 
machinery, then on broader product categories such as foodstuffs and medicinal 
products and gradually became all-encompassing. For this very reason the 
Community, in its efforts to overcome barriers to trade, had from the outset to 
tackle safety issues. With the adoption of the New Approach to technical 
harmonisation and standards in 1985 the link between market integration and 
safety policies was formally recognised. The New Approach shares a number of 
important characteristics with generals trends of modem safety legislation in 
industrial societies. 
i. Flexibility 
Safety is a normative concept. To confirm the safety of a product means 
that its attendant risks are judged to be acceptable. The assessment of products 
has to take a broad set of factors into account. The foreseeability of risks and 
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the capability of coping with risks change over time. Legislators therefore tend 
to resort to general clauses to delegate the concrete safety assessment to non-
legislative bodies and to provide for procedures which allow an adjustment in 
safety requirements. 
ii. Expertise and social considerations 
Any responsible safety judgement requires the integration of expertise into 
assessment procedures. The type of expertise needed depends upon the risks 
concerned. For many mechanical products, expertise can' be provided by 
engineers. The more sophisticated the product, the more refined the techniques 
of risk detection and evaluation must become. Risks to health and the 
environment often require scientific expertise from various disciplines (chemists, 
toxicologists, pharmacists etc.). Resort to engineering and scientific expertise 
does not, however, change the normative status of risk assessment. It is simply 
not enough to leave the assessment of risks to experts. There must, in the light 
of the the normative element inherent to risk assessment, be some external 
judgement as to the social acceptability of the risk evaluation provided, and the 
risk management suggested by experts. Whilst the legal system must integrate 
scientific judgements on the one hand, it must also pay regard to such social, 
normative evaluations on the other. This necessarily leads to co-operative 
arrangements. The structuring of such arrangements is one of the key issues of 
safety regulation. 
iii. Legislation, administration and judicial control 
The regulation of risks does not fit into classical notions and 
differentiations made between legislation and administration, politically 
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responsible and non-governmental bodies. Firstly, risk regulation blurs the 
distinction between legislation, administration and judicial control. Legislation 
cannot but define objectives and adopt general clauses. As a result the 
administrative branch must accept new responsibilities. Secondly, this 
development is accompanied and necessitated by an opening up of the legai 
system to non-governmental actors, to experts and to non-legal criteria. 
The political and legal systems cannot exclusively rely on their own 
resources and specifically legal criteria. Expertise is needed in preparing 
legisla~ion, wit~n the ~dministratio~ a~d a.t the ~pl~mentation stage. At the ( 
same tune, the mtegrahon of expertise mev1tably Implies an opening up of the 
system of government to non-governmental actors - and their interests. The 
traditional distinctions made between the powers and competences of legislation, 
administration and the judiciary are distorted by the use of general clauses, 
which delegate decision-making competences to the administration and the 
judiciary. Administrative bodies are entrusted with the task of particularising or 
developing standards or rules and with their enforcement in specific situations 
and individual cases. Those authorities invested with the power to issue rules or 
standards and to take individual decisions are thus unavoidably constrained to 
make policy choices. Such functions might then only gradually be distinguished 
from legislative actions. 
Judicial control of such decisions cannot restore the rule of law. Courts 
are neither equipped to second-guess the regulatory process in its full 
complexity, nor do they possess the legitimacy to take those policy decisions 
which legislators have delegated. There are only two options available. Courts 
may identify particularly sensitive policy areas in which legislative responsibility 
must not be delegated at all. But in general they will neither refer regulatory 
\ 
M 
F. 
tasks back to the legislator nor try to check whether the substantive content of 
regulatory decisions is correct. Judicial control must instead concentrate ~n 
procedures and their rationality, on guaranteeing participatory and individual 
rights, on the adequacy and fairness. of interest representation and the existence 
of the balanced consideration of expert opinions. 
1.3. Specific Difficulties at the Community Level 
At the Community level the development of regulatory policy-making 
through legal procedures, shares all the general characteristics and problems 
outlined above. However, the Community's legal system is distinct and the 
problems it faces are more complex than those of national systems. 
i. Expertise, cu.ltu.rnl traditions, trade interests 
Experts act within professional and scientific communities. These 
communities share the broader values and cultural traditions of the society to 
which they belong. Arriving at consensus within an international setting is 
therefore more difficult than within nation states. Divergences are less likely 
where the expertise needed is strictly scientific and truly international scientific 
communities already exist. It would, however, be premature to assume that this 
condition be generally fulfilled. The field of engineering in particular, possesses 
diverse professional traditions. Agreements on technical standards, consensus on 
the methods of testing out certification and on the acceptance of individual 
decisions taken can be difficult to achieve. 
Consensus building is further complicated where economic interests are 
at stake. Even if all participants in the decision-making process agree in 
' 
1 
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· 1 · m· terests should be irrelevant, cost-benefit principle that nationa econormc 
assessments may vary simply because of the differing socio-economic conditions 
which necessarily and legitimately influence safety assessments. 
ii. Administrative resources and competences 
As indicated in the introduction, regulatory policy at the Community level 
has traditionally, and in many areas still does, focus on rule making. In 
preparing legislation, in carrying out those rule-making competences delegated 
to it, the Commission depends upon the proliferation of expertise within national 
administrations. This factual dependency is inextricably linked with institutional l 
constraints. The Community lacks genuine administrative competences in the 
field of social regulation, which would empower it to directly enforce its 
decisions. The responsibility for implementing decisions taken at the Community 
level rests with the Member States. The more the Community turns to very 
general rules, the more difficult it becomes to ensure the uniformity of their 
substantive implementation within the Member States. An assessment of specific 
situations within the Member States involves both the application of a given rule 
or standard and the interpretation of this rule or standard in the light of broader 
legislative objectives. This alone leads to great diversity in the choices which 
individual decision-makers take. But the particular characteristics of risk 
regulation further aggravate this situation. It is in fact the function of risk 
regulators to react to new examples of risk and thus to continually develop new 
standards as new problem arise. For this system to be effective as a whole, 
however, new standards set in relation to new risks must be communicated back 
to a central authority and out again to other decentralised risk evaluators. The 
Community, however, neither posseses the technical nor the 
resources to run such a system smoothly and effectively. 
administrative 
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2. How Regulatory Policies Should be· Constructed. 
The involvement ofthe Community in tisk regulation requires policies 
that reflect the complex characteristics of the_ risk problem. 
Technical and scientific expertise must be provided at all stages of the 
legislative process and its implementation. This expertise is neither readily 
available nor can it easily be generated. The "Europeanisation" of expertise upon 
which a mutual recognition of risk assessments and consensus building may be 
built, presupposes the setting up of an infrastructure which not only ensures 
continuous cooperation between the Community and national administrations, 
but also an ongoing involvement of those communities of experts on which 
national administrative authorities rely. 
It is the job of experts to transform their special knowledge and 
experiences into practical suggestions. This transformation does not take place 
:in isolation. It is embedded in a normative and social process in which experts 
represent, articulate and respond to- broader societal experiences and demands. 
This embeddedness of risk assessments justifies in principle participatory rights 
~
in, and the openness of, risk assessment procedures. Public discourse on the risk 
problems in Europe is, however, still predominantly national. It is likewise 
difficult to conceive of the representation of social interests at the European 
level. For the time being the European consumer and environmentalist 
organisations remain relatively weak, whereas trade unions have been more 
active in their organisational efforts. These differences between the 
internationalisation of science, the gradual Europeanisation of expertise and 
political processes which are still bound to national and cultural mores, need to 
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be taken into consideration when it comes to legitimising risk decisions at the 
European level. 
- Regulatory policies at the European level aim, on the one hand, at the ., 
r completion of the Internal Market, and need to be co-ordinated with industrial 
\ policy, safety at work, enviro~~ental and.consumer po~cies. On the other h~nd, 
the impact of regulatory pohctes on natiOnal economies has to be taken mto 
account. In view of the economic divergences within the Community, it should 
not be taken for granted that regulatory measures have to be uniform and all 
encompassing. Uniformity or equivalence of safety levels needs to be insure!i 
where products are marketed throughout the Community and safety interests 
must be protected through construction and production methods. But it seems 
questionable to impose advanced technologies on each and every region and 
product. 
It is crucial for .the desig~ of legisl~tive and im~lementation policies to ~ 
~ realise and to recogruse that nsk regulation cannot stmply be accomodated within traditional legal notions on legislative, administrative and judicial functions. It is likewise impossible to strictly distinguish between competences 
designed to realise the Internal Market and those which aim to protect health, 
safety or environmental irlterests and to adhere to models of executive 
federalism which assume that Member States simply execute rules adopted and 
decisions taken at the Community level. This is not to suggest that the present 
institutional structure of the Community should be neglected irl the design of 
legislative and administrative policies. But these institutional issues need to be 
redefined irl the light of the characteristic features of risk regulation. 
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At present, the regulatory responsibility for risk regulation rests with the 
Commission and a dense network of consultative, regulatory and management 
committees which is, irl the field of technical harmonisation and standards, 
complemented by cooperative arrangements with European standardisation 
bodies. Comitology has developed gradually and in step with the ever irlcreasing 
load of European regulatory legislation. The settirlg up of committees was not 
originally understood to be a technique of risk regulation in the modern sense. 
But the cornitology system proved to be flexible enough to take on complex 
tasks by differentiating between various regulatory functions. 
i. Differentiations 
Typically a threefold subdivision can be observed which corresponds to 
the various aspects of regulatory policy-making: 
a policy-making level at which final decisions are taken· 
' ~
an interest group level at which traders and other social interests 
are represented; 
a scientific level at which experts brirlg in their specialised 
-~' 
knowledge and experience. 
This differentiated structure has obvious merits. It ensures that the various 
aspects of risk assessments are taken into account. It enables the Community to 
take advantage of the Member States' administrative experience and scientific 
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expertise. It ensures that cultural and economic divergences within the 
Community can be considered. The setting up of committees with differentiated 
functions presupposes that there is sufficient expertise available at the "political" 
level to make an informed judgement. Since the "political" committees_ 
themselves are composed of expert administrators from the Member States, 
which can eventually be accompanied by qualified experts, well informed 
judgements are, in principle, to be expected. 
ii. Performance 
The performance of the comitology system depends, however, on various 
conditions. Even if committees meet regularly and develop working routines and 
commonly shared assumptions, there are limits to the workloads they can 
handle. 
Standardisation is one field where this constraint is particularly important. 
Expertise and standard setting is provided by the European standardisation 
organisations. The Commission's Green Paper emphasized the need to 
restructure the procedures of the European standardisation bodies so that 
standard setting becomes a genuine European project. Because of the growing 
importance of European standardisation the supervisory tasks of-the Commission 
become ever more challenging. Standardisation mandates must be elaborated, 
priorities be set, the compliance of standards with the safety requirements of 
directives either be checked or, as the Commissiou for good reasons prefers, be 
ensured through participation of its own experts in the work of standardisation 
committees. 
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It is hardly conceivable that the enormous amount of standardisation work 
can in the long run be guided and controlled within the Comitology system. The 
supplementation of this system through the participation of Community officials, 
together with the admission of consumer organisations and trades union 
representatives to the standardisation bodies, already indicate that a genuine 
European scheme of standard-setting is emerging. In the future perspectives 
outlined in the Commission's Green Paper, standardisation work is a natural ally 
of industrial policy and serves as an incentive to further quality-oriented 
production strategies. Such perspectives do not by any means contradict 
regulatory objectives which focus upon the protection of safety and 
environmental interests. But the public responsibility for defining and controlling 
socially acceptable levels of risks cannot be left to standardisation alone. If 
standardisation evolves as a quasi-autonomous system, the complementary 
function of public risk management- the measuring of the social acceptability 
of risk- will have to be accomplished in an organisationally independent way. 
iii. Implementation 
The task of implementing Community rules and decisions rests with 
Member States. Implementation is simple and relatively easy to control where 
Community rules specifically address particular issues such as the acceptance 
or prohibition of chemical substances and food additives. In the case of more 
general rules and standards, however, it is difficult to determine the individual 
assessments which will be made by national administrations. The Community 
has reacted to these regulatory gaps by supplementing directives with provisions 
which aim to guarantee equivalent administrative practices and substantiate the 
administrative functions Member States must fulfil. Foodstuffs law and technical 
safety law are pioneering that development. In both fields, however, a need for 
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additional and more stringent control of implementation practices has been 
perceived and means to do this are envisaged, e.g. by establishing Community 
inspection services, by substantiating further the requirements national bodies 
have to meet and by establishing horizontal links between national bodies. 
iv. The Delegation Issue 
So far, practical considerations which militate in favour of an 
"approfondissement" of the Comitology system have been emphasized. It should 
not be forgotten that the performance of regulatory functions through committees 
raises delicate constitutional issues. It is often argued that risk regulation 
involves a political evaluation which cannot legitimately be made by 
annonymous committees. If this objection were justified, it would seem 
reasonable to restore political control either by giving preference to management 
or regulatory committees or by insisting on unanimous decisions wherever 
harmonisation policies intersect with policy fields in which the Community has 
no expressly defined competence. In our view, such a solution would be neither 
practically nor legally sound. The legality of the Committees' system has been 
accepted by the ECJ. But the maintenance of residual decision-making powers 
by the Council tends to jeopardize the continuity and rationality of regulatory 
policy-making. Insistence upon the competences of Member States and 
unanimity in decision-making endangers the "quality" of the Commission's 
harmonisation policies. 
The delegation objection is misplaced because any type of risk regulation 
inevitably needs to resort to non-legal expertise and resources. The real issue is 
not "delegation" but the rationality and legitimacy of committee procedures. The 
legitimacy of risk regulation rests upon legislative mandates, the expertise and 
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political accountability of decision-makers, and judicial control. Improving the 
administrative infrastructure, providing procedural safeguards ensuring the 
quality of expertise, granting participation rights and public access to committee 
proceedings are more adequate ways to legitimise decision-making. Judicial 
supervision cannot aim to control the substantive correctness of regulatory 
decisions. Once the ECJ becomes fully aware of the nature of risk regulation, 
it will instead be forced to address the same issues that have plagued European 
and American courts, e.g. respect for procedures and rationality of decision-
making. 
' 
.I 
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Chapter Ill 
Improving the EC' s Regulatory Performance 
1. Regulating the Regulators 
The particular intensity of Community involvement in regulatory activities was 
not foreseen by the creators of European institutions. Many activities undertaken 
by the Community attempt to provide protection against health, safety and 
environmental hazards and to define the borderline between socially acceptable 
and unacceptable risks. As we have seen, however, this cannot be achieved 
through traditional legislative and judicial structures, whilst the mere monitoring 
of the implementation of Community provisions into national law simply does 
not suffice to guarantee an effective form of regulation. Attention should instead 
focus upon the co-ordination and control of those individual regulators whose 
function it is to continually define new standards. The Community must develop 
techniques and structures to fulfil this function. 
From amongst the most often cited defects of the current comitology 
system, the following should in our view be addressed: 
(i) the complexity and the ambiguity of the rules governing its 
functioning; 
(ii) its lack of transparency;. 
(iii) the lack of coherence between certain sectoral policies. 
Each of these issues will be tackled in this section of the report. 
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1.1. Streamlining the Regulatory Process 
i. Because of its distinct characteristics the legal framework of risk 
regulation must specifically focus upon the rationality, fairness and legitimacy 
of decision-making. At the European level the following elements could be 
taken into account. 
Member States already contribute considerably to the preparation of 
regulatory decisions. There may be instances where relevant information is 
withheld because representatives of Member States feel thar such information 
may be detrimental to their economic interests. Such attitudes would not be 
compatible with the duties imposed on Member States by Art. 5 of the Treaty. 
It might, however, be useful to clarify the Community's rights under that 
provision. 
Pertinent legislative and administrative provisions increasingly provide for 
public hearings prior to important regulatory decisions. Such hearings can only 
be considered if the issue really merits public debate. Rights to request public 
hearings should be considered for the European Parliament and eventually for 
regions particularly affected by Community decisions. 
Scientific committees such as the Scientific Committee for Food enjoy 
wide recognition and respect. This positive example confirms that acceptance of 
Commission decisions is in fact furthered by the quality of the Community's 
expertise. This example also suggests that selection procedures for the 
appointment of scientific experts and of interest representatives are important. 
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Laying down procedural rules implies commitments that can be judicially 
reviewed without expecting the ECJ to second-guess the substantive validity of 
regulatory decisions·. 
ii. The Europeanisation of standardisation progresses rapidly. But national 
standardisation organisations still defend their positions and national standards 
will retain some importance. The readiness to mutually recognise national 
standards might be improved if the procedures of national standardisation 
organisations, including participation rights of non-traders and supervisory 
functions of administrations, were harmonised by a standardisation directive. 
Such an initiative would also help to clarify the Community's expectations as 
to the work of European standardisation organisations, which up to now are laid 
down in the general guidelines on cooperation. 
iii. Safeguard clause procedures ~e means of correcting and updating the 
Community's regulatory rules and decisions. The right to initiate such 
procedures is restricted to the Member States. Safeguard clause procedures are, 
however, functionally equivalent to general rule-making and decision-taking 
activities at the European level. At present, the right to initiate such proceedures 
. is held solely by the Member States. In other words, the centralised authority 
alone possess such a right. Those regulatory tasks at stake, however, are often 
performed by a lower level, i.e. in Germany by the Lander. To grant such bodies 
the right to initiate safeguard clause procedures would be in line with the 
subsidiarity principle. 
IV. The most urgent task is the development of sophisticated legal 
techniques which oversee the on-going process of risk evaluation and standard 
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setting. Only in this way might the qualitative regulatory performance of the 
Member States be improved. 
- One important step the Community is already taking is the definition of 
those requirements the competent authorities in the Member States must comply 
with. 
- The ECJ has consistently held "that where cooperation between the 
authorities of the Member States makes it possible to facilitate and simplify 
frontier checks, the authorities responsible for health inspections must ascertain 
whether the substantiating documents issued within the framework of that 
cooperation raise a presumption that the imported goods comply with the 
requirements of domestic health or legislation" (case 124/81 [1983] ECR 203 at 
249). The existence of such "horizontal" duties among Member States has 
expressly been confirmed by the ECJ on other occasions (cf. case 203/81 [1983] 
ECR 255 at 278). On that basis a wide variety of positive duties to cooperate 
could be developed. Member States could be asked to interact in a productive 
way, e.g. by informing each other about pending decisions or by providing and 
admitting evidence available in other Member States . 
~ving Transparency: \Towards an ~ Administrative-
Procedures ~ \.--
The suggestions listed above aim to provide a legal framework which is 
clearly adapted to those changes now underway in administrative functions. The 
European Court of Justice has already had the opportunity to develop a number 
of general principles governing the action of Community bodies. By doing so, 
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it has paved the way towards the development of a distinct body of Community 
administrative law. 
However, it could be argued that quite apart from their efficiency, the 
growth in the number of committees, the overlap of their activities, and the 
divergences between the rules governing their functioning creates a real lack of 
transparency. In such a situation, it is difficult for Community citizens to 
identify the body which is responsible for decisions which apply to them, and 
the legal remedies which are available. 
A similar situation arose in the USA at the time of the New Deal, which 
saw, as is known, a dramatic growth in government intervention. The 
establishment of new specialised agencies, the functions of which were 
extremely complex and varied, created a need for rules to ensure they did not 
act arbitrarily or unlawfully. In the absence of a true administrative law 
tradition, the rules governing the federal administration had developed in a 
piecemeal fashion as they had been worked out in response to ad hoc needs. 
However, such an approach was deemed insufficient to cope with the changes 
under way. The Administrative Procedures Act adopted by Congress in 1946, 
aimed to legitimise the growth of federal bureaucracy by providing a single set 
of rules explaining the procedures to be followed by federal agencies and 
providing for judicial review of many of their decisions. In order to avoid any 
brutal rupture with the past, the Act had only a residual effect: in other words, 
the procedural requirements it contained were applicable only to the new 
agencies and then only to the exent that those statutes which established these 
agencies and the programmes they were to operate, did not themselves contain 
specific rules. 
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It is submitted that the Community could usefully draw on such a 
precedent. The enactment of an EC Administrative Procedures Act would of 
course provide the Community with a unique opportunity to decide what kind 
rules are more likely to rationalise decision making, to what extent interest 
groups should be given access to the regulatory process, or when judicial review 
is necessary. Even if it were to limit itself to the writing of existing practices 
into the law, such as the AP A largely did, the adoption of a single set of 
administrative rules would at least provide for a hard core of provisions 
applicable to the developing regulatory process. Such a move would bear 
witness to the EC's unwillingness to allow an unregulated growth of the 
Community's administrative functions. As such, it would certainly be useful if, 
as we believe, the Community will be called upon to establish administrative 
agencies of its own in a number of areas (see below section 2.) 
1.3 Improving Policy Co-ordination 
General developments should prompt the Community to reconsider its 
regulatory priorities. We referred above (Chapter I) to the widespread feeling 
that in certain areas methods provided for more uniformity than is sometimes 
needed. A declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty now invites the 
Commission to systematically undertake a cost/benefit analysis of its proposals, 
which suggests that sofar insufficient attention has been paid to this requirement. 
The net benefits of Community regulation, though difficult to quantify, are 
certainly large for all the Member States. At the same time, experience has 
shown that the process of regulatory decision-making suffers from a number of 
structural defects. Among the major shortcomings are the lack of rational 
procedures for selecting regulatory priorities, the absence of central coordination 
and oversight leading to serious inconsistencies across and within regulatory 
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programmes, and the insufficient attention paid to the cost-effectiveness of 
individual rules. 
The patchwork character of Community regulation and the lack of 
incentives to search for economically efficient solutions are due in large part to 
political and institutional factors such as the complexity of Community policy-
making, disagreements among Member States concerning priorities, the 
inadequacy of political oversight, and the need for the Commission to respond 
to national initiatives. 
However, the shortcomings of Community regulation also have causes that 
are intrinsic to the regulatory process. While the scope of non-regulatory 
programs is constrained by the size of the Community budget, the costs of most 
regulatory decisions are borne directly by the firms, individuals and local 
governments who have to comply with them. 
i. Defects of the regulatory process 
.,;-· 
'?t 
A large proportion of Community programmes ar~·fegulatory in nature; 
that is, they attempt to correct some particular form of market failure: monopoly 
power, economic rent, excessive competition, inadequate consumer information, 
or negative externalities like environmental pollution and technological risks. 
Moreover, both the extent and the complexity of Community regulation are 
bound to increase with the completion of the internal market. It would be 
dangerous to overlook the real possibility that a greatly expanded body of 
Community regulation may reproduce some of the same political and economic 
defects that have weakened and distorted the regulatory process in countries like 
Canada and the United States. These defects are so serious that at the present 
i 
i 
i 
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time many analysts speak of "regulatory failure" and support the ideology of 
deregulation. 
The main structural shortcomings of the American regulatory process are 
inadequate political oversight by both Congress and the President. and economic 
inefficiency - in the sense that the same quantity of resources used to meet 
regulatory objectives could be reallocated to produce a greater level of benefits. 
Political oversight should be exercised at three different levels: at the highest 
level, in order to evaluate the total impact of regulation and to decide whether 
to spend directly through government expenditures or inrlirectly through 
regulation; at an intermediate level, in order to set priorities among different 
regulatory programs, both within agencies and across agencies; and at the lowest 
level, to evaluate and compare individual rules in terms of the benefits and costs 
they are expected to produce. In practice, regulatory oversight has largely been 
confined to the lowest level - the review of individual rules - and has been 
exercised by the executive branch. 
The inefficiency of the present regulatory process is also well documented 
in the literature: striking differences in cost effectiveness both across and within 
regulatory programs and agencies; regulations that do not give incentives to 
firms and individuals to comply through the most cost-effective means available; 
wrong regulatory priorities; overlapping and partly conflicting rules; hard to 
explain differences in procedural requirements (in some cases regulatory 
decisions must be justified in cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness terms; in other 
comparable cases, federal legislation restricts or impedes administrative agencies 
from taking proper account of costs and benefits in their decisions). 
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The root cause of both economic inefficiency and inadequate political 
oversight, according to many analysts, is the absence of a regulatory budget 
procedure. Because the size of regulatory programs is not significantly 
constrained by congressional appropriations and by the level of tax revenues, as 
in the case of non-regulatory programs, the current regulatory process misses 
four steps central to bringing any expenditure process under control. First, 
neither the Executive nor the Congress systematically determine the overall level 
of regulatory activity in a given period. Second, no office in the executive 
branch or committee in Congress is responsible for systematically establishing 
regulatory priorities across government. Third, the Executive has not instituted 
any systematic process of submitting regulatory proposals to Congress. Finally, 
there is no central agency to audit regulatory programs. In short, no mechanism 
exists for regulation that requires policy-makers throughout the government to 
solve the two-level budget problem - how much to spend during a given period 
and then how to allocate this total amount among alternative uses - which is 
addressed by any government in its direct expenditure activities. 
It is not difficult to find counterparts in Community regulation for many 
of the defects of the American regulatory system. If anything, some defects are 
even more serious in the case of EC rule-making. Thus, disciplined budget 
setting is even weaker since the burden of implementing Community regulation 
is carried by the governments of the Member States. Also, because of the 
absence of a central political authority, regulatory issues are dealt with sector by 
sector, with little attempt to achieve overall policy coherence. Even within the 
same sector it would be difficult to maintain that regulatory priorities are set in 
a way that explicitly takes into consideration either the urgency of the problem 
or the benefits and costs of different proposals. For example, the imbalance 
between water and air pollution control existing in Community environmental 
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policy can hardly be explained by differences in the seriousness of the relevant 
problems. The health and environmental effects of inadequate regulation of air 
pollution, as well as the impact of divergent national regulations on competition, 
are no less serious than in the case of water pollution. 
Again, some product directives choose total harmonisation while others 
rely on optional harmonisation, without any obvious connection with the 
perceived seriousness of the relevant environmental or health risks. And the 
piecemeal procedure of the Commission in proposing new regulation has 
resulted in directives in areas where harmonisation is a low priority, while 
neglecting other areas which need a considerable amount of harmonisation. 
ii. A useful analogy: The :regulatory budget 
If it is true that lack of budgetary discipline is a basic reason for the 
structural defects of the regulatory process, one should attempt to create control 
mechanisms similar to those traditionally used in the case of direct public 
expenditures. Following this line of reasoning, several analysts of the American 
regulatory process have proposed the introduction of a regulatory budget. In its 
basic outline the regulatory budget would be established by Congress and the 
President for each agency, perhaps by starting with a budget constraint on total 
private expenditures mandated by regulation, and then allocating the budget 
among the different agencies. By setting a budget constraint on mandated private 
expenditures, the regulatory budget would clarify the real costs to the economy 
of adopting a regulation and encourage costeffectiveness. The knowledge that 
agencies would be competing against each other would lead them to propose 
their "best" regulations in order to win presidential and congressional approval. 
Simultaneous consideration of all new regulations would permit an assessment 
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of their joint impact on particular industries and the economy as a whole. 
Finally, the placement of the regulatory budget decisions in the hands of 
Congress and the President would force them to assume responsibility for the 
overall magnitude and priorities of regulation. 
The process would approximately work as follows. Before a regulation is 
even be proposed, it would be presented to a central clearing house within the 
executive branch - presumably the Office of Management and Budget - together 
with a preliminary analysis of its private mandated costs and benefits. The OMB 
would compare the proposal with other proposals made by the same agency and 
other agencies and together with those agencies would compile and then submit 
to Congress the government-wide proposed regulatory budget. 
An important element of the congressional review process would be the 
creation of regulatory budget committees, charged with the task of evaluating 
the regulatory proposals and presenting a unified legislative package to the floor 
of each chamber. These committees, it is argued, would create a new set of 
congressional experts on the economics of regulation, just as the traditional 
expenditure budget committees have created a class of legislators with budgetary 
and general macro-economic expertise. Of perhaps greater importance, the 
regulatory budget committees would create a group of legislators interested in 
the overall consequences of government regulation to counteract the coalition 
between special interests groups and traditional authorising committees. 
Regardless of how congressional deliberations are structured, the essential 
feature of the regulatory budget process would be the approval by the full 
Congress of both a total ceiling on all mandated private expenditures and 
individual ceilings broken down by agency or even by rule. The final stage of 
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the ideal budget procedure would be regular auditing and an effective sanctions 
mechanism for cutting back the regulation or disciplining the agencies in the 
event an authorised budget ceiling is exceeded. 
Unfortunately, a number of serious technical difficulties have to be 
resolved before the regulatory budget could actually be implemented. First, it is 
not clear what the basis for establishing the size of the budget would be. Unlike 
the usual budget, there are no analogues to revenues and deficits that constrain 
the size of the regulatory budget. One possible solution of this problem would 
be to include in the budget all regulations that meet a cost-benefit test. Provided 
agreements is reached about the quantitative estimates, this would maximise the 
net benefits from regulation. 
The second and more serious problem is that of estimating the full social 
cost of regulations, especially when the regulations restrict outputs or behaviour 
rather than merely requiring outlays for compliance. For this reason it has been 
suggested that experiments with the regulatory budget be tried at one or two 
agencies, preferably ones where the policy instruments rely more heavily on 
direct costs. If, for example, a company producing electricity is forced to add 
a scrubber to an existing plant, the costs can be estimated with little difficulty. 
In a dynamic framework, however, the situation becomes more complex. It may 
be difficult to anticipate changes in technology and, thus, changes in costs over 
time. 
A third group of difficulties concerns the design of effective sanctions for 
noncompliance. Private mandated expenditures never show up in a regulatory 
agency's books. For this reason there is no simple way of keeping an automatic 
control on the agency's running out of regulatory appropriations. Thus, an 
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agency could overrun its regulatory budget without anyone knowing it, for there 
is no automatic way of debiting a private cost against the agency that mandates 
it. Still, costs could be estimated and debits entered to agency accounts. 
In conclusion, none of the problems may be individually insuperable; but 
taken together they are sufficiently severe to make it unwise to propose the 
regulatory budget as a practical approach to regulatory reform. Nevertheless, 
because the budget is such a useful analogy for highlighting the defects in the 
current regulatory process, a promising approach consists in developing methods 
of regulatory oversight and control that incorporate budget concepts in a 
workable fashion. 
iii. Possible directions for reform 
A number of ad hoc mechanisms of coordination already exist on the 
American scene. What would be needed is a systematic survey and evaluation 
of the various types of coordinating mechanisms in order to determine to what 
extent they have succeeded in resolving jurisdictional problems and improving 
overall regulatory consistency. 
In addition, it is worth pointing out that a number of instruments have 
potential for coordination, although they have not generally been viewed as 
iiJ~. coordinating tools. A significant example is the environmental impact/ 
r ~ ..,assessment (ElM recently introdUCed also into Community legislation: American 
"' experience under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) suggests c 
that EIAs have considerable potential as a successful coordinating mechanism. 
As is known, the NEP A requires all federal agencies to analyse the 
environmental effects of proposed actions and of reasonable alternatives to such 
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actions. From the viewpoint of coordination perhaps the most significant part of 
the requirements is the review and comment process. Because of its obligations 
under the NEP A and the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) is the only federal agency to comment on practically all impact 
statements. The review and comment period serves as an opportunity for inter-
agency coordination since it assures active participation by all agencies involved. 
One mechanism instituted by most Federal agencies (including the 
Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Defense, Energy, 
Interior, Health, Housing, Justice, Labor, and Transportation) to improve 
execution of NEP A responsibilities, has been the creation of special high level 
offices within the agencies. Such "NEPA offices" have apparently been most 
successful in coordinating interagency work on issues that cross agency lines, 
in providing information, and establishing contacts with state and local agencies 
and the public. NEP A offices that report directly to agency heads, or their 
deputies, appear to be the most effective. 
To introduce a similar coordinating mechanism into the Comm::-1 
policy-making process (but also to implement the requirement "u::t I 
environmental considerations shall become part of all the other Community 
policies which was recently strengthened by the Maastricht Treaty) it would be 
useful to institutionalise an internal review procedure whereby the Directorate-
General for Environment would comment on programme proposals made by the 
other Directorates-General (similarly Rehbinder and Stewart 1985). The 
coordination potential of the review procedure would be vastly increased if EIAs 
were not limited to individual projects, as in the present EC directive, but could 
be extended to cover groups of related programmes ("joint environmental impact 
assessments"). 
! 
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Despite their practical usefulness, administrative mechanisms of 
coordination and indirect methods such as the EIA are certainly not sufficient 
to ensure a correct choice of priorities and the overall consistency of Community 
regulation. Hence another focus of attention must be the issue of central 
coordination. One possible model, suggested by the analogy with the budgetary 
process, deserves special investigation: a regulatory clearing-house located at 
a sufficiently high level in the Community bureaucracy, possibly in the office 
of the President. Directorates-General would be asked to submit annually draft 
regulatory programs to the clearing-house for review. When disagreements or 
serious inconsistencies arise, the President or a "working committee on 
regulation" would be asked to intervene. By extending centralised control over 
the regulatory agenda of the Directorates-General, this review process would 
help the Commission shape a consistent set of regulatory measures to submit to 
the Council and the Parliament. The usefulness of the procedure as a tool of 
managerial control could be increased by coordinating the regulatory review 
with the normal budgetary review, thus linking the level of budgetary 
appropriations to the cost-effectiveness of the various regulatory programmes. 
One key function of such a clearing-house system, in addition to providing 
for greater coherence would be to flesh out the concept of subsidiarity: only 
through the systematic review of the proposals put forward by the various 
Directorate-Generals will the Commission be able to determine when action by 
the Community is necessary. 
This is not to say that Community intervention would sytematically be 
made more difficult. It might indeed be the case that a review process will lead 
to the conclusion that the goal of streamlining regulatory procedures and 
reducing their costs might only be achieved through the shifting of regulatory 
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responsibility from the national· to the Conimunity level. For example, since 
1965 the Commission has been concerned with the harmonisation and 
unification of regulatory rules for the approval of new drugs and the mutual 
Community-wide recognition of national drug approvals. 
However, experience has shown that the "multi-state drug authorization 
procedures" established under Directive 83/5701 (and, more recently, Directive 
87 /22) have limited effectiveness. Differences between national schools of 
medicine, different attitudes toward the evaluation of risks and benefits, and 
differently perceived needs for new drugs tend to lead to different interpretations 
of applications for new drug approvals, despite the fact that they have been 
prepared according to a standardised European format. 
It would be much more efficient to replace the cumbersome multi-state 
application procedure by entrusting the whole drug approval process to a central 
regulatory agency - the European Drug Agency. The establishment of such an 
agency would make a significant contribution toward shortening the drug 
approval process, reducing development costs, and lengthening the effective 
patent duration. 
We have set aside questions of political and institutional feasibility. It 
would be naive to underestimate them. But however tight the constraints, they 
should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, in the perspective of a fully 
:integrated European market and the consequent growth in volume and 
complexity of Community regulation, the question of regulatory reform can no 
longer be evaded. 
1 OJ 1983 L332/1. 
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2. Structuring the Administrative Partnership 
Legal commitments alone cannot guarantee productive cooperation. Such 
cooperation needs to be systematically encouraged and supported. This is why 
the creation of specialised bodies (agencies, bureaus, offices) should, in our 
view, be considered at the Community level. Prior to considering how this could 
best be done, it might prove useful to say a few words explaining the various 
forms of agency which operate in the United States. Having seen the American 
model we might then explain why Europe should develop its own very distinct 
form of specialised bodies. 
2.1 The American Agency Model(s) 
Before discussing the American model or, rather, the variety of American 
models of regulation by means of single-headed agencies or collegial boards and 
commissions, it seems useful to call attention to the distinction between 
regulatory function and the different means by which the function can be 
performed. The main justification of regulation is its capacity to increase the 
allocative efficiency of the market by correcting various types of market failure: 
monopoly power, insufficient provision of public goods, negative externalities, 
asymmetric information, and so on. In order to achieve these regulatory 
objectives, different countries have used different means. For example, in 
Europe nationalisation has been a historically important method of regulating 
natural monopolies in transportation and public utilities. Where these industries 
have been privatised, as in Britain, the regulatory function has been assigned to 
new administrative bodies, the "Regulatory Offices". In the United States, on the 
other hand, nationalisation having been rejected for political reasons, regulation 
I 
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of natural monopolies was accomplished from the 19th Century onwards, by 
means of independent commissions. 
Regulation can also be achieved by delegating regulatory responsibilities 
to private bodies, by reliance on legal remedies, by taxation, or by specialized 
agencies operating outside the central structure of government, as in the 
American case. Experience suggests that specialised and more or less 
independent bodies are the most effective means of regulating areas of economic 
and social life characterised by great complexity and a high degree of 
innovation. The evidence comes not only from the United States, but also from 
the recent proliferation of regulatory agencies in Europe (regulatory offices in 
Britain, autorites administratives independantes in France, amministrazioni 
indipendenti in Italy, etc.). 
Despite these new developments in Europe, the century-old experience of 
the United States remains valuable because of the variety of methods that have 
been tried there. It is impossible to review here a history which, at the federal 
level, begins in 1889 (when the Interstate Commerce Commission was created 
on the basis of pre-existing models of state regulation). Our highly selective 
treatment attempts to clarify aspects of the American experience which are often 
overlooked. 
_!he typical American agency has powers of rule-makin ~judication of 
individual cases, and enforcement. However, one also finds in American 
administrative history a weaker version, termed the "sunshine commission" 
because of its reliance on disclosure and public information ("regulation by 
information"). The outstanding example here is the Massachusetts Board of 
Railroad Commissioners created in 1869. This commission issued no orders that 
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the regulated industry was legally bound to obey, except for orders to produce 
information. Sometimes the Commission also specified the form the information 
had to take. For example, the agency often required railroads to submit data in 
standard accounting forms that would facilitate a comparative statistical analysis 
of different companies. Through its informal approach to regulation, the agency 
maintained a stable truce with the railroads, based on flexibility and cooperation. 
It is interesting to note that even now the most successful agencies are 
precisely those which rely, to some extent, on the model of "regulation by 
publication". The best illustration is provided by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Nearly all American business executives are familiar with the 
agency because of the reporting requirements it enforces. These include the 
public disclosure of detailed informations about their companies and even 
disclosure of their own salaries and perquisites. 
The strategy followed by the Massachusetts Board amounted to a reversal 
of the state's traditional railroad policy, which had produced a number of 
stringent laws that everyone then ignored. The Board, by foregoing the role of 
adversary, avoided the embarrassing impotence of the early railroad statutes. It 
also avoided the troublesome question of constitutionality in the delegation of 
legislative power to agency discretion. 
This brings us to another aspect of the American regulatory experiencf~' 
the independence of the agencies from the central structure of government, an~ ' 
the consequent issue of political accountability. According to some critics, the 
independence of the agencies implies a lack of political accountability to any 
elected officials. As Marver Bernstein wrote in 1955: "The dogma of 
independence encourages support of the naive notion of escape from politics and 
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substitution of the voice of the expert for the voice of the people ... The 
Commission has significant anti-democratic implications" (Bernstein, 1955: 293). 
To evaluate these arguments, one must keep in mind that, in this context, 
independence means that the members of the regulatory commissions are 
appointed for fixed terms and cannot be removed by the president for reasons 
of policy disagreement. The commissions are certainly not independent of 
Congress. In fact, oversight by committees and subcommittees of Congress is 
usually exercised vigorously. The legislators have two powerful instruments of 
control at their disposal; an agency's organic statute, i.e. the Jaw creating the 
agency, and budgetary appropriations. The statute establishes goals and 
objectives, sometimes in great detail, with deadlines for goal achievement and 
an indication of the instruments to be used. If Congress becomes displeased with 
agency operations it can pass amendments prescribing or proscribing certain 
agency activities (Reagan, 1987: 156). Recent empirical studies of the 
effectiveness of congressional control over the bureaucratic discretion of a major 
regulatory agency, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), have found that FTC 
activity, measured by the distribution of its caseload, is in fact systematically 
responsive to congressional influence (Faith, Leavens and Tollison, 1987; 
Weingast and Moran, 1987). Similarly, the historical study by William Kovacic 
shows that the FTC, rather than ignoring prevailing congressional sentiment as 
some suggest, chose antitrust programs that were consistent with and responsive 
to the clearly articulated preferences of its oversight committees in Congress 
(Kovacic, 1987). 
Budgetary appropriations constitute, of course, a basic control over an 
agency's ability to implement a statute, but, as Michael Reagan (1987: 157) 
points out, "for oversight purposes it is less the funding than the suggestions and 
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directives - given with increasing frequency in 
reports accompanying 
appropriation bills - that make the appropriation process the most powerful form 
of congressional oversight". Thus, an increasing body of evidence strongly 
l. 
~uggests ~h~~, at least as far as congressional oversight is concerned, the political/ 
rrresponsiblltty of regulatory agencies is largely a myth. , 
But presidential control of the agencies has also been progessively 
extended. Presidential authority to revise the funding requests of agencies and 
independent commissions and to combine them into a single executive budget 
for submission to the Congress, was legislated in 1921 and reinforced by the 
transfer of the Bureau of the Budget (now Office of Management and Budget) 
from the Treasury to the Executive Office of the President. Another very 
important instrument of control, is the power to appoint agency heads, 
commissioners and other top non-civil service personnel. The president's 
authority to determine who will chair the regulatory commissions was extended 
in the 1950s, and with some apparent success (ib.: 160). 
The latest developments in presidential oversight emphasize procedural 
rather than substantive controls. In 1978 President Carter pushed the application 
of economic analysis to regulation by an executive order creating the Regulatory 
Analysis Review Group (RARG). Another innovation of the Carter presidency 
was the introduction of a "regulatory calendar", a biannual compilation of 
forthcoming federal regulations under consideration by the agencies. The 
calendar requirement was a useful step since, for the first time, the public and 
all the various government agencies had the possibility of knowing in advance 
what proposals were scheduled. The calendar was also designed to provide 
information about the benefits and costs of these proposals and hence the means 
for a rational evaluation of priorities among competing regulatory initiatives. 
47 
However, the reforms of the Carter period proved to be ineffective in 
influencing the behaviour of regulatory agencies, in part because as the 
administration's term wore on, the President's attention was increasingly 
diverted by non-regulatory issues (Litan and Nordhaus, 1983). 
President Reagan abolished the RARG, and instead made the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the OMB the institutional focus 
of presidential oversight. While President Carter had permitted, and in fact 
advocated, greater use of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory decisionrnaking, 
Reagan's Executive Order 12291, issued in February 1981, required that all 
major regulatory decisions (i.e., those that impose costs of over $ 100 million 
per year) now be justified in cost-benefit terms. Despite the political motivation 
of the Reagan's reforms - the desire to curtail the scope of federal regulation -
there are reasons to believe that cost-benefit analysis will continue to be viewed 
as an essential requirement for rational decisionrnaking in regulation. 
2.2. Why bas the Agency Model been so Little Exploited in the EC? 
Specialised bodies similar to US Agencies are rather rare at the 
Community level. Of the various structures established by the Treaties, only the 
European Investment Bank or the Euratom Supply Agency bear some similiarity 
to the American model. Whilst, as we shall see below, specialised bodies of 
various types are now being proposed in several areas, it is useful to understand 
why this evolution has been so retarded. 
In the first place, it should be noted that nothing in the EC treaties 
provides for the creation of this kind of structure. Article 4 of the EEC Treaty, 
lists the various institutions operating at Community level and specifies that each 
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of them must act "within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by the 
Treaty". This has generally been read as a prohibition on the establishment of 
futher organs, to be overturned only following a Treaty revision (Lenaerts, 
1992). As early as 1958, the European Court of Justice also indicated .that the 
delegation of powers by Community institutions to ad hoc bodies not envisaged 
by the ECSC Treaty was possible only subject to strict conditions and that in 
any event, the delegation of broad discretionary powers was not permitted2• 
However, to state that the Community's institutional structure did not 
provide the kind of flexbility that was needed somewhat begs the question: why 
then did those who drafted the Treaty choose to limit the Community to certain 
types of intervention? Two factors can explain this choice. 
The first is the role the Member States intended to play in the integration 
process. We have seen earlier (Chapter I.l.) that this largely contributed to the 
emphasis that was laid on an essentially legislative approach to integration 
problems through a cumbersome harmonisation process. This point might not be 
overstressed. The expansion of Community competences in the 1970s and the 
early 1980s, for instance, can only be understood with reference to the near total 
control Member States enjoyed over the policy-making process. In this way the 
Community appeared to be merely one additional instrument in their hands 
' 
rather than a usurping power. For this reason a mutation which in any federal 
system would have been at the expense of the component units, and thus 
1\· . 
2 
Case ~0/56, M~roni, (19.5?-58] ECR 157. It is generally held that although this ruling dealt 
wtth the farrly detailed provtStons of the ECSC Treaty, its conclusions are mutatis mutandis 
applicable in the broader context of the EEC Treaty (Kapteyen and VerLoren van Themaat, Gormley 
ed., 1990, 121-122). But most o~ th~ a~en~ies now proposed take power away from the Member 
States, rather than from Commumty mstttuttons. The relevance of the Meroni precedent in this type 
of situation is therefore dubious. 
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opposed by them, was readily accepted by the Member States of the Community 
(Weiler, 1991). 
However, this "neutral" character of the integration process will last only 
as long as Community intrusion into spheres which have been traditionally part 
of the Member States' competence is compensated for by representation of the 
Member States at all stages of the decision-making process. This concern has 
led to the establishment of expert committees, composed of Commission and 
Member States representatives, to assist the Commission in its executive 
functions. 
Any departure from the comitology model of action is therefore likely to 
meet with strong resistence. In particular, the delegation to an autonomous body 
of wide-ranging law-making and enforcement powers similar to those enjoyed 
by American agencies, is likely to be resented by the Member states as too 
intrusive since it would alter the delicate balance of power which has presided 
over the growth of Community competences. Undoubtedly, concerns of this kind 
1 have played an important part in determining the functions granted to the newly 
~ established European Environment Agency, which is more concerned with 
~ research and data collection than with regulation per se. 
Secondly, mention should also be made of those elements of European 
administrative culture which have certainly played a role, albeit a lesser one, in 
those developments under review. The creation of specialised agencies endowed 
with broad powers is far from a being traditional feature throughout Europe. On 
the contrary: regulatory functions are often assigned to ministries, or to the 
cabinet as a whole (Majone, 1989). Even in the realm of monetary policy, where 
the need for expertise is widely accepted, the recent debates over the creation 
~ 
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of a European system of central banks have clearly shown that most central ~ 
V banks do not enjoy the same degree of autonomy as does the Deutsche 
f Bundesbank. Many of them are still largely dependent on decisions made by the 
Treasury. Governmental supervision and indirectly, Parliamentary monitoring of 
administrative action, are often regarded as pre-conditions for a democratic 
society. All this makes it rather unlikely that national governments will be 
willing to concede to Community bodies powers that they are rarely prepared 
to delegate to domestic bodies. 
2.3. What Kind of Agency Might be Useful and when? 
Given these premisses, one might wonder if the agency concept can be of 
any help at all at the current stage of institutional development within the 
Community. Politically, Member States seem unwilling to alienate further 
aspects of their sovereignty, be it in favour of autonomous organs. Legally, the 
delegation of law-making powers to independent bodies appears to go beyond 
what is permissible within the framework of the current treaties. What role, if 
any, can agencies conceivably play in such a context?3 
The answer lies, in part at least, in the question itself: to be acceptable, 
Community agencies must pay due consideration to the above reservations. In 
other words, what is envisaged here is not a mere transposition of the American 
model. The establishment of specialised agencies should not be equated with the 
complete preemption by the Community of entire sectors in which the Member 
3 For the sake of simplicity we will retain the word 'agency', as it used in various Community 
texts establishing specialised bodies. Sight should not, however, be lost of the fact that the term 
agency might mean many things. 
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States have to date been active. Rather, the ambition of these bodies should be 
to supplement and assist action taken by the Member States. 
Agencies could help to solve many problems which the present system 
cannot adequately solve, such as: 
providing expertise in preparing, carrying out, evaluating and coordinating 
Community policies; 
establishing links between national administrations and building up issue-
centred expert networks; 
systematically informing decision-makers about projects carried out by, 
or on behalf of, competent authorities within or outside the Community; 
supporting those Member States with scarse administrative resources; 
monitoring implementation, and helping in the organisation of exchanges 
of experience; 
commenting upon practical experiences and helping to develop innovative 
regulatory responses. 
By gathering information and providing for its exchange and by 
organizing expertise, agencies can hope to develop a real "communaute de vues" 
among national experts. By preparing policy decisions and providing assistance 
to Member States whose regulatory capacity is weaker, they can equally 
" t' d' t" n4 promote une communau e ac 10n . 
4 Functions of this kind have been entrusted to the newly established Environmental Agency (OJ 
L120/l of 11 May 1990), and are envisaged in two drafts currently under discussion (draft regulation 
establishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, OJ C310/7 of 30 
November 1991, draft regulation establishing an European Agency for Health and Safety at Work, 
COM(90) 564 final of 25 September 1991). 
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It is fair to say that some of these functions are already undertaken within 
the current comitology setting. Yet, the agency structure would present several 
advantages: greater stability, providing a much needed long term perspective, the 
possibility of more systematic action, etc. In addition, European agencies could 
play a crucial role in the public discourse on risk policies. For, despite the 
emphasis so far laid upon the necessity to "Europeanize" expertise, we should 
point out that risk assessment cannot and should not be understood as a task 
solely to be performed by to experts, operating in isolation from broader social 
developments, cultural traditions and values. Member States participation in the 
functioning of agencies, the involvement of unions, environmental and consumer 
organisations and the willingness and ability to disseminate information to 
interested actors, can all contribute to legitirnising European policy-making. 
Entrusting the Commission with such and similar tasks would not, in our 
view, be a valid alternative. The Commission's administrative structure is 
currently too weak to take over new functions and it is unlikely that the Member 
States would be willing to grant to it the additional means that would be 
necessary. In contrast, the setting up of what one could call a "quasi-agency" 
structure, pooling together the expertise available at national level, should elicit 
a more positive response. 
True, the loose structure which is envisaged here would not suffice in 
highly regulated areas in which divergences in national administative practices 
are of decisive importance. Those regulations governing access to the 
pharmaceuticals market offer a good example of such a constellation: short of 
a common licensing system, a true common market for pharmaceuticals seems 
beyond reach. In such cases, the possibility of entrusting a specialised agency 
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with a decision-making power of their own ought to be considered5• Yet, in the 
light of the subsidiarity principle, a quantum leap of this kind should be initiated 
only when and if it appears that a centralisation of decision-making is necessary 
to find a remedy to an administrative impasse. 
3. Implementation Plans 
3.1. Some Reflexions on the US model 
The establishment of specialised agencies is not commensurate with the 
centralisation of regulatory enforement. American regulatory federalism 
combines a variety of approaches and techniques to improve cooperation 
between the states and the central government in enforcing regulation. This is 
particularly true in the areas of environmental protection and health and safety 
at work, which form the core of "social regulation" and contribute a significant 
portion of the $510 billion which economic and social regulations are supposed 
to have cost the U.S. economy in 1990. 
The main types of intergovernmental regulatory programs may be 
summarised as follows: 
5 This is more or less what is envisaged for pharmaceuticals although, formally, all legally 
binding decisions of some importance would be taken by the Co~si.on upon a proposal.presented 
by the Agency (see above, note 7). As indicated abo.ve. (n~te 5), 1t IS not clear that this kind of 
precaution, clearly inspired by the M eroni precedent, IS md1spensable. 
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Typology of Intergovernmental Regulatory Programs 
Program Type 
Cross-cutting 
requirements 
Cross-over sanctions 
Partial preemptions 
Description 
Applies to most 
federal assistance 
programmess to 
ensure broad coverage 
Threatens to terminate 
aid provided under 
one or more specified 
programmes unless 
the requirements of 
another programme 
are satisfied 
Establishes federal 
standards, but permits 
states with federally 
approved plans to 
enforce standards 
Major Policy Areas 
Non discrimination, 
environmental 
protection, grants 
managements 
Highway safety, 
environmental 
protection, health 
planning, handicapped 
education 
Environmental 
protection, natural 
resources, 
occupational . health 
and safety, meat and 
poultry inspection 
This section reviews the nature and use of federally-approved state plans in 
the field of health and safety at work - an area of growing importance in the 
EC, for which it is important to assess the relevance of the American 
experience. The use of federally-approved state implementation plans in 
environmental regulation has been analysed by Richard Mott (Mott, 1990). 
In 1970, when the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) was 
passed, few American states had comprehensive laws dealing with safety and 
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health at work and fewer still had adequate programs to enforce them. The 
judgement of Congress that existing state laws were unable to provide 
meaningful protection to the nation's workers is evident in the legislative 
history of the Act. Above all, sponsors of federal legislation criticised the 
lack of uniformity among safety and health programs, which created 
competitive disadvantages and discouraged nationwide progress in this 
important area of social regulation. However, the OSH Act does not provide 
for the complete federalisation of occupational safety and health enforcement. 
The objective of assuring safe and healthy conditions at the workplace was to 
be reached, in part by "encouraging the States to ass.ume the fullest 
responsibility for the administration and enforcement of State occupational 
safety and health laws", by means of federal grants and approved state plans 
(OSH Act Section 2(b)(ll)). 
The reasons for encouraging state participation were twofold. First, 
since it would take time to promulgate state standards and create a program 
for their enforcement, permitting the state safety and health agencies to 
continue to function would provide workers with at least some degree of 
protection during the interim period. Second, there were some states that had 
administered effective programs prior to the passage of the act. Concern was 
expressed during the legislative debates, that these services not be lost to the 
overall safety and health effort. 
The OSH Act incorporates special mechanisms for utilising state 
resources. The most important of these are the provisions for state plans 
contained in Section 18(b) through to (g). While the Act generally preempts 
state enforcement once the federal government regulates, Section 18(b) 
provides that states desiring to regain responsibility for the development and 
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enforcement of safety and health standards under state law, may do so by 
submitting and obtaining federal approval of a state plan which meets the 
strict requirements set forth in Section 18(c), (see below). Approval of a state 
plan by the Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) permits the state 
to re-enter the field of occupational health and safety regulation. 
In Section 18 Congress adopted an innovative regulatory approach, 
authorising the joint exercise of authority by state and federal agencies. Two 
points should be noted in this context. First, federal enforcement powers are 
not delegated to the states. Instead, Section 18 permits states with federally 
approved plans, to enforce state standards under the authority of state law, 
using state administrative and judicial procedures. Second, federal approval of 
a plan is not a single regulatory event; rather, it occurs in stages. Initial 
approval of a plan under Section 18(b) is granted if upon submission of the 
plan, OSHA finds that the plan meets or will meet the criteria set forth in 
18(c). 
During the period of initial approval, OSHA may exercise its 
enforcement authority concurrently with the state, with employers subject to 
inspection and citation by either authority. Initial approval is the most 
significant step in the plan approval process as it removes the preemption 
barrier and permits the state both to commence enforcement operations and to 
receive federal matching grants. 
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i. Criteria for State Plans 
a. Standards 
A state must provide for the development of state standards "at least as 
effective" as corresponding federal standards. In fact, the great majority of 
state standards under approved state plans are identical to their federal 
counterparts. Where states choose to develop their own standards, OSHA 
must evaluate the effectiveness of the state's rule-making procedure as well 
as the substantive content of the resulting standards. State standards that 
differ from corresponding federal standards must provide equal or better 
protection than their federal counterparts; moreover, the state must assure that 
subsequent judicial and administrative interpretations of a state standard do 
not compromise its effectiveness. The principal limitation on the standards-
setting authority of those states with an approved plan is found in the 
"product standard limitation" of Section 18( c )(2). This provides that state 
standards, where applicable to products distributed or used in inter-state 
commerce, must be necessitated by compelling conditions and must not 
unduly burden interstate commerce. 
b. Enforcement 
Section 18(c)(2) requires state plans to provide enforcement of state 
standards at least as effective as federal enforcement. The remaining 
subparagraphs of this section contain criteria which emphasize the importance 
of state provisions that adequately provide for right of entry and inspection, 
funding and staffing and state reporting requirements. Enforcement 
procedures generally mirror those used in the federal system. Adoption of a 
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procedure manual, resembling the OSHA Field Operations Manual has been a 
required developmental step (see the section on the approval process, infra) 
in virtually all states, as has been the promulgation by the states of 
administrative regulations comparable to federal regulations, governing such 
matters as inspections, citations, penalties, review procedures and variances. 
Section 18(c)(3) requires state inspection rights to be at least as effective as 
those available to OSHA. 
c. Staffing 
Sections 18(c)(4) and (5) state that the Secretary of Labor (in whose 
Department OSHA is located) is to approve a state plan, only if it provides 
"necessary" qualified personnel and "adequate" funds to carry out 
enforcement functions. 
Prior to 1978, OSHA had developed numerical staffing requirements or 
"benchmarks" for each state plan. These staffing requirements were 
challenged by the labor unions (AFL-CIO), on the ground that the 
benchmarks used by the Secretary of Labor were predicated on federal 
enforcement levels that were artificially low (the Secretary was accused of 
deliberately withholding a commitment to the provision of adequate resources 
until he knew the full extent of likely state participation). 
Court proceedings ensued, culminating in a decision by the District of 
Columbia Circuit (AFL-CIO v. Marshall), that reversed the district court's 
grant of summary judgement in favor of the Secretary. The district court, on 
remand, issued an order directing the Secretary to develop a 5-year schedule 
for each state, to meet the "fully effective" staffing levels, taking into account 
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certain specified factors in each state, such as the number of employees and 
employers; the number of hazardous industries; the number of schedule 
inspections that should be conducted; the anticipated number of accident, 
complaint, and follow-up inspections required; and the number of inspections 
a compliance officer could perform. 
ii. The Approval Process 
a. Application 
Section 18(b) provides: "Any State which at any time desires to assume 
responsibility for development and enforcement therein of an occupational 
safety and health issue with respect to which a federal standard has been 
promulgated under section 6 shall submit a State plan for development of 
such standards and their enforcement". 
Once the governor of an interested state has designated an appropriate 
agency to formulate a plan, the state becomes eligible to receive federal 
funding for plan development. Each state plan must meet certain specified 
conditions before it will be given the Secretary's approval. Of greatest 
importance is that each plan must designate or create a new state agency to 
enforce the plan. There must similarly be procedures for standards 
promulgation and rulemaking and there must be provisions for enforcement 
and adjudication. State plans must also demonstrate the availability of 
adequate funding and the existence of a sufficient number of trained 
personnel. 
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b. Developmental Stage 
For the first . three years after initial approval, all state plans are 
considered to be "developmental". The most important feature of the 
developmental stage is that during this period the federal and state 
governments have concurrent jurisdiction. 
During the developmental period the Secretary evaluates, monitors, and 
audits the state plan at least every six months. States with approved plans 
must submit annual activity reports and inform the public of its right to file 
written complaints during this three year period. This procedure is known as 
CASPA (Complaints About State Plan Administration). The information from 
these reports is used by OSHA to help determine whether a developmental 
plan should be rejected or certified as operational. 
c. Operational Stage 
When all developmental steps are completed, OSHA issues and 
publishes in the Federal Register, a formal notice of certification. This action 
signifies the beginning of the "operational" stage of the state plan. 
Theoretically lasting one to two years, the operational stage usually involves 
no federal compliance activity, but OSHA retains discretionary concurrent 
jurisdiction. During this stage there is also more intensive monitoring of the 
state plan by OSHA. 
The entire approval process, of which the operational stage is the last 
step, is designed to lead to final approval, pursuant to section 18(e). When a 
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state plan is ready for this final authorisation, a notice is filed in the Federal 
Register. The public may submit any comments and if substantial objections 
to final approval are received, a formal hearing will be held. A final decision 
will then be issued within 120 days. 
Once a state plan has been definitively approved, the Secretary may 
continue periodic monitoring to determine if the state plan has remained as 
effective as federal regulation. If the state plan has failed to maintain its high 
standards, the Secretary may begin proceedings to withdraw approval of the 
plan. 
d. Modification 
Most alterations to state plan come about as a result of an OSHA 
evaluation. The authority to review and approve the modifications to the state 
plan, formerly vested in Washington, is now delegated to the Assistant 
Regional Director. 
The most important changes in a state plan are the addition and 
modification of standards. As federal standards are changed and added to, 
state plans must be constantly revised, so that the state plan remains "as 
effective as" federal regulation. While there is some leeway given in safety 
standards. OSHA requires that state health standards rigidly adhere to federal 
standards. 
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e. Rejection and Withdrawal 
Any state plan submitted for initial approval failing to meet OSHA 
requirements may be rejected only after a formal hearing. If its plan is 
rejected, a state may demand a review of the Secretary's decision by filing a 
petition within 30 days with the U.S. court of appeals. for the circuit in 
which the state is located. The Secretary also may withdraw approval of a 
certified operational plan if a state fails to continue its management in a 
satisfactory manner. 
Finally, a state may voluntarily withdraw its plan or any portion of it 
by notifying the Secretary in writing of its reasons for so doing. The notice 
of withdrawal must be accompanied by a letter terminating the application for 
any requested grants (there are two main types of grant: a) developmental or 
planning grant of up to 90 percent of a state's cost of preparing the plan; b) 
state operating grant, only available to states whose plans have been certified 
as operational. These grants may not exceed half of the state's total cost). 
iii. The Future of State Plans 
As of 1990 there were 21 states with approved state plans for private 
and public sector employees and two state plans (Connecticut and New York) 
covering only state and local government employees. California, Indiana, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, 
Vi~ginia and Washington are the most important states with approved state 
plans. 
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The reasons why more than half of the American states have decided 
not to submit state plans (and thus to be "federalised") are complex, but tend 
to be economic rather than political. With maximum federal operational 
grants of ·only 50 percent, instead of the earlier 90 percent for development, 
many states may find it increasingly expensive to keep the plan "as effective" 
as the federal OSHA. This is particularly true in the area of health hazard 
enforcement, where a greater federal emphasis will force states to hire more 
inspectors and to buy expensive monitoring equipment. Unless the funding 
formula is changed, economic reasons may cause states to withdraw plans 
voluntarily or to have their approval withdrawn by OSHA. Connecticut and 
Colorado have already done so. In California, it took a ballot initiative to 
restore Cal-OSHA to operational status. Few of the states with approved 
plans are large industrial states. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and 
Illinois voluntarily withdrew their applications and Ohio never submitted a 
plan. It is possible that as more agricultural health standards are adopted 
some of the smaller, agricultural states will also find that state plans are too 
expensive to maintain. 
3.2. Could such a Model be Transposed at the EC Level? 
Implementation plans have attractive features on several distinct levels: 
- states retain the possibility to act if they see fit; 
- in order for them to do so, they must meet precise standards; 
- such a flexible solution takes due account of the fact that not all states 
enjoy a similar regulatory capacity; some of them need federal assistance 
in order to meet national standards. 
In other words, implementation plans provide a possibility to reconcile two 
apparently conflicting trends: the desire to have high standards applied in a 
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uniform manner throughout the country, and the desire of the states to retain 
their responsibilities in a number of areas. 
Yet, one must be aware that the overall efficiency of the system is 
conditional upon two important elements. Firstly, as regards the legal setting, the 
rule is that implementation of federal standards is taken care of by federal 
administration; state implementation remains an exception, subject to a special 
authorisation, which can be withdrawn at any time. Secondly, in administrative 
terms, the federal government has the technical capacity to take over the 
functions assumed by the states in cases where this proves necessary. The 
combined effect of these two elements is of course to give credibility to the 
threat o{~~~~~~fre~~ 
The setting is of course radically different in the Cornmmunity. Far from 
being the exception, decentralised implementation tends to be the rule (see 
above). Yet, to require Member States to draw up an implementation plan and 
to set up the means that are necessary to make it operational would force them 
to address the implementation issue more systematically than is currently the 
case. They would need to identify the means - both human and financial - which 
will require mobilisation if the objective set at Community level is to be 
reached. Resources from the structural funds could be used to assist those 
Member States lacking sufficient resources to develop the requisite structures. 
Naturally, incentives must be formulated which encourage Member States 
to comply with Community rules. Short of this, the concept of implementation 
plan would add little to the current practice. This, however, does not imply that 
the Community should be given the power to act on its own in case a Member 
State should fail to meet Community standards. Financial aid could be made 
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conditional upon national regulators' performance, and should be withdrawn 
here they fail to meet Community standards. Non-compliance might also re~ult 
w ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--"--
in the suspension of certain benefits attached to the single mark:!_:_~oo~s 
(;"ngiilatlilgfrom a ~~-;e~~ might be 
subject to systematic controls in other countries, or even be denie:;d,::",c~c::":"<,~~~=".,": .. ·.=c.-
national m11rk~1s. As producers from these markets have an interest in access to 
~~--d~,~~~"~,~~-'~ • • 
- foreign markets, it is likely that such a threat would provide a strong mcentlve 
to comply with EC rules. Where such incentives exist, it would not be necessary 
for the Community to intervene in lieu of defaulting Member States, which 
intervention would undoubtedly result in delicate institutional debates. 
~ yet it is clear that such a system can work only if the Community is f 
j 1\ . t 
technically equipped to assess the adequacy of implementation plans, to momtor 1 
\\_ the activity of national administrations, to provide guidance - all missions that,/ 
' \by its own admission, the Commission is currently not in a position to carry our 
~atisfactorily, but which could be entrusted to agencies organised along the lines 
live described above (see point 2.3). 
This notwithstanding, one could argue that the proposed scheme is quite 
in line with the subsidiarity principle: Member States would retain their primary 
responsibility in a number of areas, while the Community's main task would be 
to assist and supplement their action. In other words, it would be given powers 
of its own "only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot 
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States" (Art. 3B). 
/ 
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Chapter IV 
Improving the EC's Enforcement Capacity 
1. Introduction 
Any discussion of potential improvements in the EC's enforcement 
capacity needs to be set in a broader context. Tills can be summarised by four 
remarks. 
First, ·as is well-known, in every legal system there is a gap between the 
law on the books and the law in action. It would be very surprising if 
Community law were any different. The mere existence of such a gap should 
not necessarily be a cause for concern. What is more important is to concentrate 
on those which are problematic and capable of resolution. Tills involves an 
effort to map the gaps which exist; to explain why they exist; to identify those 
gaps which are likely to be more enduring or long-term characteristics of the 
Community system; and if possible to distinguish and identify those ideally less-
enduring gaps which pose real problems for the operation of the internal market. 
This in turn invites reflection on the general purposes of the Community and its 
existing institutional structure. 
Second, the enforcement of Community law is part of the more general 
conceptual domain of the effectiveness of Community law. Effectiveness may 1 
refer not only to enforcement but also to implementation, impact or compliance./.,' 
There is no universally accepted definition of these terms, in particular with 
respect to Community law. Nor is there very much empirical research with 
67 
regard to Community law on these topics. It may be suggested, however, that 
it is most useful to conceive of effectiveness, implementation, impact and 
compliance, not as static phenomenona or fixed states of affairs, but instead as 
complicated, multi-directional processes of reaction and adaptation, potentially 
involving political and legal processes and changes in organisations. 
Thlrd, enforcement is often considered to be the same as implementation. 
----~-~~~-~-------~-~-----"-~-~ - -~-~~"-~-~-
The latter is, however, a much broader concept. The implementation of 
~~~c~-~-~-- ,~ ·-- '''~,---•••'• ~ ,_,,,, '' - ''' 
Community law may take many different forms. Even from the formal doctrinal 
standpoint we can distinguish at least{~:e;: !rg~~ (1) the 
enactment of Community policy into legislation by Community institutions; (2) 
the implementation of Community regulations by the Member States; (3) the 
transposition of Community directives into national law; ( 4) litigation in a 
national court based on a Community directive which has been recognised as 
having, or is argued to have, direct effect; (5) the interpretation by national 
courts of national legislation in the light of Community law; (6) the 
implementation of Community secondary legislation or of national transposing 
or implementing legislation, within or by the national civil service; and (7) the 
use of Community law by economic undertakings, other organisations and 
individuals, in the sense that they orient their behaviour in relation to 
Community law. For the present purposes, only (3), (4), (5) and (6) are deemed 
to be enforcement. 
Fourth, the basic type of legislation for implementing the internal market 
programme is the directive. Two features of this type of legislation are pertinent 
here. On the one hand, directives involve a two-phase legislative procedure in 
which, following the enactment of the directive at Community level, Member 
States must transpose the directive into national law. On the other hand, 
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directives are designed to harmonise rather than replace national legislation, with 
the result that national transposing legislation may differ in each Member State. 
Leaving aside possible eventual modifications of these features, each of them 
currently raises a well-known problem of( ;nforcemen!J On the one hand, 
'----------· Member States may not fulfil their legal obligation to transpose a directive into 
national law, either by failing to enact the transposing legislation, or by 
transposing a directive inadequately or partially. On the other hand, uniform 
application of Community law depends partly upon mutual recognition, partly 
upon national administrations, and partly upon litigation within national legal 
systems; its effective enforcement thus often depends ultimately upon national 
legal and political systems. 
Against this background, the following paragraphs consider three means 
of improving the EC's enforcement capacity: (1) changes in the Commission's 
litigation strategy; (2) the role of private parties, in particular in litigation based 
upon directly effective Community legislation; and (3) possible new remedies. 
2. The Commission's Litigation Strategy 
Litigation by the Commission in the Community system has several 
distinctive features. First, the Commission initiates cases by both proactive and 
by reactive means, but the latter outnumber of the former by a ratio of 
approximately three to one and most complaints come from companies, not 
private individuals or other sources. Second, enforcement actions against 
Member States are based on Article 169 EEC, which provides a three-stage 
procedure, comprising two administrative stages and one judicial stage. The 
Commission has complete discretion in conducting such actions. Third, a very 
high l?roportion of enforcement actions are settled (or otherwise disposed of) out 
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of court: for every 100 complaints in 1990, the Commission sent 62.5 formal 
notices but only 16.4 reasoned opinions, only 5 were referred to the European 
Court and only 2.4 went through to judgment. Third, the Commission is a 
repeat player in the Community litigation system. In addition to its role under 
Article 169, it is a necessary intermediary in actions by one Member State 
against another under Article 170 EEC; it is a privileged applicant in actions for 
annulment under Article 173 EEC; and it intervenes as a matter of course in 
every reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 EEC. In addition to 
other advantages, the Commission can play for rules. 
These elements suggest two preliminary conclusions. 
First, as used by the Commission, negotiation and litigation are not 
alternatives; instead they are complementary. This is not merely to say that the 
main form of dispute settlement used by the Commission is negotiation, and that 
litigation is just an extension of this process. Rather, litigation by the 
Commission is essentially a part of continuing processes of negotiation, 
especially in view of the fact that the plaintiff and the defendants in enforcement 
actions are both repeat players involved in continuing relations. Consequently, 
the relations between negotiation and litigation should be analysed and used 
consciously as a matter of policy. Potentially at least, the Commission should 
be able to use litigation in a continuous, proactive as well as reactive way, so 
as to create counters, lay down conditions or establish frameworks for 
negotiation. In other words, it can convert litigation into a resource so that 
litigation is an aspect of its negotiating strategy. This will be even more 
important because the Maastricht Treaty, assuming that it is duly ratified, 
provides the possibility for lump sum or penalty payments for failure to comply 
with a decision of the European Court of Justice. 
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Second, the Commission should examine more systematically its use of 
litigation and consider the possibility of developing a litigation strategy. This 
would involve an analysis of the Commission's past and current practice of 
litigation, the elaboration of coherent strategies for going to court if this has not 
already been done, and consideration of the possibility of establishing a service 
or unit for monitoring the Commission's litigation practice. By virtue of its 
position in the Community system, the Commission should be able to 
concentrate not simply on winning individual cases, but also and more 
importantly, on using litigation to establish basic principles. 
3. The Role of Private Parties 
The role of private parties in the enforcement of Community law is 
crucial, first, because private parties supply most of the complaints to the 
Commission, and second, because the application of Community law relies 
essentially on the national law and legal institutions in the Member States as 
invoked by private parties. These facts were recognised in the 1985 White 
Paper, but their implications deserve further consideration. 
Since the early 1960s the European Court of Justice has elaborated a 
specific way of increasing the role of private parties in the enforcement of 
Community law. It has gradually constructed what we can call a judicial liability 
system. In effect, it has established a liability rule providing that a plaintiff can 
seek relief from a government agency for specified conduct. The system is 
triggered by suits or complaints; the government agency need not of course be 
a court. 
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The European Court developed the elements of this judicial liability 
system in three overlapping stages. All involved litigation concerning 
Community directives. First, the Court established that, assuming certain 
conditions were satisfied, a directive could have direct effect, in the sense that 
it could be invoked by a private party against an organ of the state in a national 
court. Second, it laid down guidelines according to which national law, falling 
within the sphere of application of a directive, was to be interpreted by national 
courts in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive. Third and most 
recently, it decided that the full effectiveness of Community rules might be 
called into question, and the protection of enforceable Community rights would 
be weakened if individuals could not obtain compensation under certain 
conditions, where their rights were infringed by a breach of Community, law for 
which a Member State was responsible. 
As a means of supervision and control, the creation of a judicial liability 
system is not unusual. However, the system which has been developed by the 
European Court has distinctive features. First, the liability rules have been 
established by the judiciary, rather than by legislature. Second, they have 
involved judicial decision and interpretation, not legislation. Third, they have 
been directed mainly at governments, rather than private organisations. Fourth, 
the specified conduct which is their target is 'procedural' rather than 
'substantive', namely the failure of Member States to fulfil their Treaty 
obligations, in particular by failing to transpose Community directives into 
national law. Fifth, and consequently, the system is limited in scope: it is 
designed to achieve a specific aim, namely the correct transposition of 
Community directives. Sixth, the government agency from which relief may be 
sought is, in the last instance, the European Court, that is, the same agency that 
is the initial source of the liability rules. Seventh, the system itself relies on -
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and thus strengthens - one of the key relationships in the Community's federal 
dynamic, namely the relationship between national courts and the European 
Court, in particular by breathing new life into the form of judicial co-operation 
envisaged by Article 177 EEC. 
This discussion suggests at least four tentative conclusions; possible new 
remedies are dealt with later. First, though developed piecemeal by the European 
Court rather than systematically by the legislature, the judicial liability system 
should be recognised as a system. This implies a further analysis of the 
pertinence of its elements and the coherence of the whole. Second, it may be 
time to re-assess the current law that directives do not have 'horizontal' direct 
effect, that is, that a directive cannot be enforced between two private parties 
intet se. Third, though the implications of the Marleasing judgment are not 
entirely clear, the enforcement of Community law may be improved by greater, 
continuing attention to the role of national courts in interpreting national 
legislation in the light of Community law. Fourth, it may be suggested that 
consideration should be given to expressing some of the elements of this judicial 
liability system in legislative form. Recourse to courts can never be the principle 
means of enforcing Community law, and courts are often not the most suitable 
institutions for performing such functions. The judicial liability system 
elaborated so far by the European Court of Justice as part of the 
'constitutionalisation' of the founding Treaties deserves further consideration in 
this light. 
4. New Remedies 
Joined Cases C-6/90 and 9-90 Francovich represents a fundamental 
change in Community constitutional law. However, this case is very recent, the 
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Court's judgment is expressed in general terms, and the longer-term implications 
of the ruling have yet to become clear. The elements which merit further 
consideration include the particular form of Community acts in question, the 
potential plaintiffs, whether the existence of a prior judgment against the 
Member State under Article 169, with regard to the same directive or other act, 
is a condition precedent to an action for damages, and the conditions laid down 
by the Court for such an action. They could be clarified in future cases, in 
which the Commission may wish to consider seeking statements of principle to 
resolve existing ambiguitities. In addition, the Court could be asked to declare 
expressly in future actions under Article 169 whether the conditions for liability 
have been satisifed. In the meantime the Commission may wish seriously to 
consider issuing an interpretative communication with regard to the judgment. 
Another possibility which might be considered, is that of 'cross-over 
sanctions', in which the failure of a Member State to fulfil its Community 
obligations in one domain would be sanctioned by a sanction against that 
Member State in another domain. Such measures are provided in the ECSC 
Treaty, Art. 88, 3rd para., subpara. (a). This possibility was canvassed in a 
Commission staff paper to the 1991 Intergovernmental Conferences, but the 
serious practical and political difficulties which it involved were given a great 
deal of emphasis. Despite the related revision of Article 171 as a result of 
Maastricht, this possibility deserves to be reviewed. 
Even though Community rights are to be enforced in national courts and 
according to national legal procedures, the European Court's jurisprudence has 
increasingly impinged on national legal remedies. It may be suggested that, in 
fact, it is beginning to contribute to the restructuring of national procedural 
systems. It is time to take stock of this situation, especially since differences in 
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national remedies affect the extent to which individuals can rely in practice, on 
rights derived from Community law. In addition, it may be suggested that 
further consideration should be given to the adoption of legislation designed to 
harmonise national systems of remedies for the enforcement of Community 
rights. Otherwise Member States fail adequately to fulfil their obligations under 
Article 5 EEC. 
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Conclusion 
Making the Single Market Work 
The success of the internal market programme lay in its apparent lack of 
ambition. The objective itself appeared to be a mere restatement of the 
traditional concept of the common market, which formed the core of the 
founding treaties. The White Paper programme did not entail any significant 
transfer of competences or of financial means to the Community. Nor did it 
require a radical institutionally reform. Yet, in part because of this apparently 
low profile, the internal market played a central role in the revival of 
Community fortunes in the 1980s. 
As the completion of the internal market now approaches, it becomes 
evermore clear that the Community is called upon to deal with problems of a 
new nature. It is impossible to promote free trade without somehow paying 
attention to the risks inherent to economic activity. The Community's traditional 
means of intervention are ill-designed to address issues of this kind. At the 
same time, the involvement of the Member States in the pursuit of Community 
policies remains one of the cornerstones of the EC's institutional balance. The 
current system of decentralised implementation has enabled the Community to 
intervene in a growing number of areas without pre-empting all opportunities for 
intervention on the part of national administrations. 
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Making the single market work thus requires the setting up of a 
framework within which the Community might be able to fulfil new functions, 
without undermining the degree of control exercised by the Member States. 
This result can be achieved with innovative instruments which will 
improve the Community's co-ordination and control functions, without 
presupposing a complete take-over of given tasks. Likewise, more emphasis 
should be laid on incentives than on sanctions. 
1) Streamlining the regulatory process should be one of the priorities. This 
would involve systematically organising co-operation between the Community 
and the Member States, by better defining the tasks and duties of all actors. At 
the Community level, this could be achieved inter alia through the adoption of 
an EC Administrative Procedures Act. The need for horizontal co-ordination 
among the units responsible for various sectoral policies should also be 
acknowledged. Here an apposite response might take the form of a central 
clearing-house for new legislative proposals, which body would be given the 
task of controling whether Community action is necessary and determining what 
the priorities should be. 
2) Implementation concerns should be addressed at the very outset of the 
legislative procedure. Implementation plans would greatly aid both in defining 
needs and in evaluating available resources; adequate incentives, both positive 
and negative, should encourage compliance by the Member States. 
3) The Community's co-ordination and monitoring capacities should be 
strengthened by the creation of specialised agencies which pool together the 
expertise available at national level. The tasks of these bodies would in effect 
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be limited to assisting and, if necessary, supplementing the regulatory policies 
conducted at national level. 
4) Lastly, as regards judicial policy, some thought should be given to the 
possibility of harmonising those judicial remedies available to private parties in 
cases of a violation of EC law. Generally speaking, however, more attention 
should be paid to the use of incentives rather than to concrete sanctions. Neither 
the Commission nor the European Court of Justice would be able to 
systematically address infringements of Community law. This should lead the 
Commission to revise its litigation strategy, and go to court only in ultima ratio, 
when no alternative is available, or a decision of principle is to be made by the 
Court. 
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